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Abstract
We present a theory that examines the optimal match between rm
R&D units and external partners for projects that involve problem solving.
We have a rm selecting an external partner conditional on the learning
costs of its internal R&D unit. We show that there exists a matching
equilibrium with property that external partners with low learning costs
for a project work with R&D units that also have low learning costs for
the same project. Empirically, we use a dataset of Spanish R&D rms and
relate their share of R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition
of their R&D units, described by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD. Our
main nding is that, controlling for endogeneity, rms that employ R&D
sta¤ with a PhD outsource relatively more to universities than to rms.
We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with relatively low
learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external partners,
universities, with relatively low learning costs for the same projects.
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1 Introduction
The importance of external sources of knowledge for rm innovation has been ex-
tensively examined (Hagedoorn, 2001; Thursby and Thursby, 2006; Branstetter,
2005; Alcacér and Chung, 2007). Hagedoorn (2001) documents a steady increase
in inter-rm R&D partnerships during the 1980s and the 1990s. Branstetter
(2005), Thursby and Thursby (2006), and Alcacér and Chung (2007) provide
evidence that rms increasingly rely on input provided by universities and that
the quality of this input determines the countries in which rms choose to locate
their R&D activities.
The existing literature has focused on the role that the absorptive capacity
of rms plays in their choice between conducting their R&D activities internally
or in collaboration with external partners (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Cassi-
man and Veugelers, 2002). Other studies have focused on the importance of
incoming, source-specic, spillovers for rmsdecisions regarding the partners
they collaborate with in their R&D projects (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002;
Belderbos et al., 2004; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005). Another important as-
pect of rm R&D collaboration that has received little attention is the optimal
match between a rms internal R&D unit and a potential partner on an R&D
project, conditional on some characteristics of both partners.
Our analysis intends to ll this gap by extending the theory of hierarchi-
cal sorting, developed by Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2005), and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), to the optimal match between a rms
internal R&D unit and an external partner for projects that involve problem
solving and that require the active participation of the internal R&D unit. We
test the prediction of our theory using a rich database on R&D in Spanish
manufacturing rms.
In the theory, a rm has to choose a project from a menu of projects that
di¤er in the level of some characteristic. We examine projects that are complex
enough to require the rms internal R&D unit to work in collaboration with an
external partner. The advantage is that the external partner has a lower cost of
learning to solve problems that are relevant to the project and thus can solve a
larger proportion of problems than a rms R&D unit. As we consider a situation
of sticky labor, and thus the composition of the internal R&D unit is xed, the
choice of the project depends on the learning cost of the internal R&D unit. We
show that there exists a matching equilibrium with property that, for a given
project, external partners with low learning costs for that project work with
R&D units that also have low learning costs for the same project. This allows
the external partner to relatively specialize in the solutions to less common
problems, while the internal R&D unit relatively specializes in solutions to the
most common ones. This result is interesting in that it suggests that, for joint
R&D projects that involve problem solving, it is not protable for a rm to
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entirely outsource the solution of problems to an external partner, and have the
internal unit specialize on the application of these solutions. On the contrary,
rm prots are maximized when also the internal unit actively participates in the
solution of problems and when it does so at the lowest possible learning costs.
In this way, the external partner avoids spending time assisting the internal
R&D unit and dedicates its limited time to solving the least common problems.
While our model is an extension of the theory of hierarchical sorting within an
organization developed by Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2005), and
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), it di¤ers in two important aspects. First,
our model deals with the optimal match between an internal rms unit and
a partner, outside of the rms organization. Yet, even in this case we show
that an optimal matching occurs, along the lines of the learning costs of the
rms unit and the partner. Second, we examine a situation with sticky labor
and, thus, in our case, the choice of the external partner is conditional on the
project a rm has selected, which has to reect the (invariant) learning cost
structure of the internal R&D unit. Finally, relative to the theory of absorptive
capacity, our model proposes a complementary explanation of the mechanisms
that allow a rm to extract a value from its collaborations. In their seminal
paper, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that the value to a rm from a
collaboration increases in a rms level of investment in those assets that are
specic to that collaboration. In our model, such type of investment decreases
the learning costs for the problems the partners have to solve, and with that it
increases the value of the collaboration to the rm, relative to other types of
collaborations the rm can engage in.
We test the theoretical model using information from a sample of Spanish
manufacturing rms that conducted innovation activities during 2006-2009. We
estimate a model in which we relate the share of rmsR&D outsourcing to
universities with the compositions of their R&D units, described by the presence
of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The logic here is that both universities and R&D
units with PhD sta¤ face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects
than either companies to which a rm may want to outsource or sta¤ who
lack PhD degrees (see for example Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Aghion et
al., 2008; Lacetera, 2009; Gruber et al., 2012). We nd evidence that R&D
units with PhD sta¤ tend to collaborate relatively more with universities than
with other partners, even after controlling for endogeneity in the composition
of the internal unit. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with
relatively lower learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external
partners, universities, with relatively lower learning costs for the same projects.
In contrast to previous empirical studies on incoming spillovers (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004) and on rmsinternal R&D intensity
(Leiponen, 2005; Lopez, 2008), our results are novel in that they focus on the
composition of rmsR&D units rather than on the information they can access
externally or internally. Moreover, while previous studies have examined the role
of incoming spillovers on the likelihood of collaboration with di¤erent categories
of external partners, we focus on the relative importance of external partners to
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a rm R&D unit. We argue that the pattern of external collaborations reects
an optimal match of internal R&D units and external partners along the lines
of their learning costs for the projects they work on. Finally, in contrast to
the work by Cockburn and Henderson (1998), which examines the correlation
between a rms degree of connection with universities and the rms patent
productivity, we look at a rms decision regarding the partners it collaborate
with in its R&D projects, conditional on the composition of its R&D unit.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces
the model. Section three presents an empirical estimation of the theory. Section
four concludes.
2 A matching model of outsourcing
In this section, we present a model in which the manager of an R&D rm needs
to select a project from a menu of projects that di¤er in some characteristic. Our
focus is on projects that involve problem solving. In this model, labor is sticky
and the rms project choice depends on the knowledge of its internal R&D
unit, the composition of which does not change. This analysis is appropriate
to analyze the short-run decisions of rms, especially in contexts, in which the
labor market is characterized by important rigidities, such as that in Spain.
Once the rms manager has made her choice, she needs choose an external
partner to collaborate with the internal R&D unit on the project. We examine
rmsR&D projects that are complex enough to require the support of an ex-
ternal partner. The fundamental problem facing the rm consists of nding the
optimal match between an internal R&D unit and an external partner, accord-
ing to some characteristics of both. This study is based on models developed
by Garicano (2000), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), and Garicano and
Hubbard (2005) and extends them to the optimal match between rm R&D
units and external partners to which the rm outsources a component of its
R&D projects.
Intuitively, the advantage of hiring an external partner is that the partner
faces lower costs to solve the problems that are generated from a project and,
therefore, can solve a larger range of problems than a rms R&D unit. The
comparative advantage at solving problems of the external partner derives ei-
ther from the experience it has accumulated from working on similar types of
projects in the past or because it has either the necessary instrumentation or
the appropriate incentives to solve problems at relatively low costs.
2.1 Model setup
A rm needs to choose a project, p, from a continuum of projects, [p; p]. Projects
di¤er in a characteristic, and they are ordered according to increasing levels of
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this characteristic. Hence, p is endowed with the lowest level of the characteris-
tic, and p with the highest. The rm can only choose one project. This project
involves problem solving. As in Garicano (2000), Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006), and Garicano and Hubbard (2005), problems di¤er in that some of them
occur more frequently than others. The cumulative density function of problems
is F (z), with higher values of z being associated with rarer problems. Thus,
f 0(z) < 0.
A rms R&D unit divides its time between learning how to solve problems
and producing. We assume that the unit spends an amount of time t on pro-
duction and the remaining time learning how to solve problems. Moreover, for
every unit of time the R&D unit spends on production it encounters a problem.
We assume that the cost of learning to solve problems on the interval [0; zi], ex-
pressed in units of time, is proportional to the length of the interval and equal
to cizi. Thus, if an internal R&D unit spends cizi units of time learning how to
solve problems, up to zi, it will dedicate the remaining time (1   cizi) to pro-
ducing. The R&D unit can solve a proportion of problems equal to F (zi) and
requires external assistance for the remaining (1  F (zi)). Essentially, the unit
can solve the most common problems and seeks assistance for the less common
ones.
The rm needs to pay the external partner a payment, K. The market of
external partners is competitive, and, thus, each partner is paid an amount,
K, which is equal to the opportunity cost of participating in the rms project.
We assume that the opportunity cost is the same for all external partners. The
logic here is that the external partner specializes in solving certain types of
problems, and it can either use its knowledge for the project that the rm is
interested in working on or for other projects with other partners. During the
time that the partner works with the rms R&D unit, which we normalize to
1, the partner learns how to solve problems on the interval [0; ze], at a cost
ceze and provides assistance to the rms unit for the problems that the latter
cannot solve. The learning costs of the external partner have to be lower than
those of the internal R&D unit, (ce < ci), otherwise the rm would not nd it
protable to hire an external partner to work on a given project. We rule out
the possibility that the external partner might spend time producing problems
relevant for a rm by assuming that the time cost of producing one problem
faced by the external partner is greater than one. The logic here is that the
comparative advantage of the external partner lies in problem solving and not
in production. This assumption rules out the possibility that a project might be
entirely outsourced to an external partner. Similar to Garicano (2000), Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), and Garicano and Hubbard (2005), assisting the
R&D unit involves a time cost, h, with h < 11 , that is incurred by the external
partner whenever it assists the rms R&D unit. Thus, even if the external
1 If assisting an internal unit were to require an amount of time greater than or equal to 1,
the external partner would not have enough time to learn to solve problems that are relevant
for a project.
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partner does not know the solution to a problem, as this lies within the interval
(ze; 1], it still incurs the cost h, which we can view in this case as the partners
cost of determining whether it knows the solution to the problem. This cost is
the same for all external partners.
The time constraint of the external partner is:
1 = ceze + h(1  F (zi)) (1)
Given the time constraint of the external partner, the lower the proportion of
problems that the rms R&D unit can solve, the greater the time the external
partner has to spend assisting the unit, and the less time it has left to learn the
solutions to problems that are relevant for a project. In this model knowledge is
cumulative (Griliches, 1979), and thus, even if the external partner assists the
rms unit to solve problems in the interval (zi; ze], it still has to learn how to
solve problems in the interval [0; zi]. This setting corresponds to a situation in
which the external partner needs to spend some time to acquire the knowledge
the rms R&D unit has accumulated on a project before it is able to assist the
unit in expanding its knowledge frontier.
From the external partners time constraint (1), we derive an expression for
ze, which is equal to:
ze =
1  h(1  F (zi))
ce
(2)
The external partners fraction of problems it can solve, which corresponds
to its knowledge level, is an increasing function of the knowledge level of the
rms R&D unit, zi. The greater zi is, the lower the range of problems for which
the R&D unit requires external assistance, and the greater the time the external
partner can dedicate to learning how to solve rarer problems. Moreover, ze is
decreasing in ce. This is because the larger ce is, the greater the cost of learning
how to solve problems in a given range, and the smaller the range of problems
solved is.
2.2 The managers choice of an internal R&D unit and
the external partner
The relevant decisions for a rm can be described as follows. The rm selects a
project, p, from the interval [p; p]. It then selects an external partner that will
collaborate with the internal R&D unit on the project, such that their match
maximizes the rms prots. The match between the rms R&D unit and the
external partner occurs with respect to their learning costs, ci and ce, for the
project the rm has selected. Conditional on the learning costs of the internal
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R&D unit and the resulting match with the external partner, the rm chooses
the knowledge levels of the R&D unit and the external partner, zi and ze, that
maximize the rms prots. The choice of the internal units knowledge level,
zi, has to be such that, for given values of ci, ce and h, ze > zi. If this were not
the case, the rm would not nd it protable to hire an external partner.
The rms revenue, R, derives from commercializing the output that is gen-
erated from a project. Production occurs any time that either the internal R&D
unit or the external partner knows the solution to a problem. Thus, the rms
revenue is equal to F (ze)(1   cizi), given that zi is a subset of ze. The in-
puts zi and ze are substitutes in the rms production function because @R@zi@ze
< 0. This is because R depends on the proportion of problems that are solved
and the resulting production. However, because the internal unit has to divide
its (limited) time between solving problems and producing, the rm faces the
following trade-o¤. The more time the internal unit spends solving problems,
which allows the external partner to concentrate on the least common ones and
increases the total fraction of problem solved, the fewer problems end up being
produced. We shall restrict our attention to the case in which the magnitude of
substitution is su¢ ciently small and, specically, smaller than F (ze)cize . For the
region of the parameters such that this condition holds, the fraction of problems
solved by the external and the internal unit is decreasing in ce. The alternative
would be that increasing values of ce lead the internal unit to make up for the
high learning costs of the external partner by solving an higher fraction of prob-
lems, and hence reducing the time the external partner has to spend assisting
the internal unit. We rule out this alternative as we (reasonably) assume that
the primary goal of hiring an external partner is to ease the task of the internal
unit, without the latter having to make up for the deciencies of the rst.
The costs the rm has to incur are represented by i) the payment owed to
the R&D unit w = w(c), and ii) the payment owed to the external partner that
takes the form of a lump-sum payment equal to K. The payment, w(c), the rm
o¤ers to the internal R&D unit is a function of the R&D units average learning
costs for the projects it is required to work on during its life-cycle. Because we
are interested in a rms projects that require some level of outsourcing, we posit
that K is su¢ ciently small to ensure that the rm always nds it protable to
outsource part of the project. Relaxing this assumption would imply that the
rms project choice takes into account the cost of hiring an external partner.
Moreover, we assume that K is at least equal to the compensation that the
internal R&D unit with the lowest learning cost for p would receive. This
assumption rules out the possibility that the external partner might nd it
optimal to be hired by the rm.
We dene the rms maximization problem as:
max
zi;ze
 = F (ze)(1  cizi)  w  K
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Substituting for ze, we rewrite:
max
zi
F (
1  h(1  F (zi)
ce
)(1  cizi)  w  K
The rst order condition is:
@
@zi
=  F (ze)ci + h
ce
f(ze)f(zi)(1  cizi) = 0 (3)
The pair (zi ; z

e ), derived from the rms maximization problem, is a local
maximum given that @
2
@z2i
< 0.
2.3 Characterization of a matching equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the properties of a matching equilibrium. To
this end, we allow for a continuum of rms distributed across projects [p; p].
Moreover, for a given project, p, the density function for the R&D units cost
of learning problems relevant for project p is (ci(p)) with support [ci(p),ci(p)].
Similarly, the density function for the external partners cost of learning the
problems relevant to p is '(ce(p)) and its support is [ce(p),ce(p)].
The rst equilibrium condition that needs to be met is that, for every project,
p 2 [p; p], the number of external partners that rms nd it optimal to hire,
nD(p), be equal to the number of external partners that nd it optimal to work
for on p, nO(p):
nD(p) = nO(p)
With nO(p)  2 to ensure that the external partners market is competitive.
The second condition is that the rm should not nd it protable to deviate from
the choice of the external partner it has been tentatively assigned. Computing
the partial derivative of the optimized prots , generated from project p, with
respect to ce(p), we obtain:
@(p)
@ce(p)
=  f(ze)ze
ce
(1  ci(p)zi(p)) (4)
Because the sign of the derivative is negative, the optimal choice of the
manager consists of hiring an external partner that can provide ze (p) at the
lowest learning costs for that project. That is: ce(p) = ce(p). Thus, for c

e(p) =
ce(p), the rm does not nd it protable to deviate from its choice of external
partner.
The third condition is that the project the rm chooses, p, is such that
the learning costs of its internal R&D unit for that project maximize the rms
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prot. Computing the partial derivative of the optimized prots, , with respect
to ci(p), we obtain:
@(p)
@ci(p)
=  F (ze(p))zi(p)  dw
dci(p)
(5)
Where, dwdci(p) < 0. The choice of the project has to be such that expression
(5) is equal to zero and @
2(p)
@ci(p)2
< 0.
At the optimum, the rms optimal project choice, p, has to satisfy the
following condition: d(p)dci(p) = 0. If we take the full derivative of this condition,
we obtain:
@2(p)
@(ci(p))2
+
@2(p)
@ce(p)@ci(p)
dce(p)
dci(p)
= 0
This implies that:
dce(p)
dci(p)
=  
@2(p)
@(ci(p))2
@2(p)
@ci(p)@ce(p)
The sign of dce(p)dci(p) depends on the sign of the cross-partial
@2(p)
@ci(p)@ce(p)
; given
that by the second order condition @
2(p)
@(ci(p))2
< 0. The expression for @
2(p)
@ci(p)@ce(p)
is:
@2(p)
@ci(p)@ce(p)
=  f(ze(p))zi(p)[dze(p)
dce(p)
+
h
ce(p)
dzi(p)
dce(p)
]  F (ze(p))dzi(p)
dce(p)
(6)
This results in the following proposition regarding the matching between
internal R&D units and external partners.
Proposition 1 There exists an optimal matching equilibrium such that for a
given project, p, both the internal R&D unit and the external partner have the
lowest learning costs for that project.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 1 shows that it is optimal for a rm that the inter-
nal R&D unit and the external partner have a similar comparative advantage
in problem solving. This is because it allows the external partner to spend rel-
atively more time solving rarer problems than assisting the internal R&D unit.
Hence, the external partner relatively specializes in solving rarer problems, while
the internal R&D unit relatively specializes in solving the most common ones.
We have considered a model with sticky labor. This model is a good t
for our Spanish panel dataset, which is characterized by low levels of intra-rm
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variation in the composition of R&D units. It also ts well with any short-run
analysis of a rms project decision. However, one might wonder whether the
results in Proposition 1 also apply to a case in which rmsR&D employees
are allowed to move across rms or from a rms R&D unit to what we have
dened as an "external partner". In such a scenario, it is plausible that the
rm would select a project that guarantees the highest expected return and
choose the composition of the internal R&D unit accordingly. Given expression
(4), the rm would still nd it protable to hire an external partner with the
lowest learning costs for a project. However, it would now hire an internal R&D
unit such that, given the project chosen, its learning costs would ensure that
expression (5) equals zero. The R&D employees would either decide to work
for rm or be an "external partner", based on the expected compensation they
are o¤ered. Finally, the rm would still opt for an internal R&D unit and an
external partner that have the lowest learning costs for the project the rm has
chosen, provided that the substitution between their knowledge levels is small.
3 Empirical estimation
In the theory section we have shown that the learning costs of an internal R&D
unit determine a rmschoice of the project the R&D unit will be working on
and, consequently, the type of external partner the unit will work with. Our
main result is that for each rms project, the optimal match between an internal
R&D unit and an external partner is such that both the internal unit and the
external partner have the lowest learning costs for that project.
In this section we analyze the optimal choice of the rm regarding the type of
external partner it works with, conditional on the characteristics of the internal
R&D unit to which an R&D project has been assigned. To this end, we employ a
rich dataset on Spanish R&D manufacturing rms that conducted some amount
of R&D outsourcing. We relate these rms shares of R&D outsourcing to
universities to the composition of their internal R&D units, which we dene by
the presence of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The logic here is that i) universities
should face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects than private
companies to which a rm might want to outsource; and ii) R&D units with
PhD sta¤ should face lower costs in conducting relatively more basic projects
than R&D units with sta¤ that lack PhD degrees (see for example Cockburn
and Henderson, 1998; Aghion et al., 2008; Lacetera, 2009; Gruber et al., 2012).
Hence, for joint R&D projects, if the internal R&D units and their external
partners indeed face the trade-o¤s we have described in the theory, then ceteris
paribus we should observe that R&D units with PhD sta¤ outsource relatively
more to universities than to other companies.
3.1 Description of the dataset
The empirical analysis employs information from the Spanish Technological In-
novation Panel (PITEC), which is a statistical instrument designed to study
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the evolution of the innovation activities of Spanish rms over time. PITEC
is a panel survey conducted by the Spanish National Statistics Institute. It is
part of a European-wide project known as the Community Innovation Surveys
(CIS) that consists of a series of surveys that are administered in every Euro-
pean Union country, including Norway and Iceland, with the goal of collect-
ing information on the innovation activities of rms located in these countries.
The information provided by these surveys has been extensively used in the
economic literature to address innovation-related research questions (Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2002; Raymond et al., 2010; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011).
PITEC contains information at the rm level from 2003 to 2009, including
rms with 200 or more employees and rms with intramural R&D expenditures2 .
For the purposes of our study, we are particularly interested in the information
available on rmsR&D outsourcing, including the amount rms have spent on
outsourcing activities to universities or to other rms, and in the composition
of the rmsR&D units. For this latter aspect, we use information on the share
of full-time equivalent workers that hold PhD degrees.
While PITEC was rst conducted in 2003, we only use data for the 2006-2009
period because prior to 2006 the number of R&D personnel was not described
in terms of full-time equivalent units, and thus it is not possible to compare
the composition of R&D unit before and after 2006. As in previous studies
that have used CIS survey data (see for instance Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002;
Raymond et al., 2010; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011), we restrict our analysis to
innovating rms that operated in the manufacturing sector. Our denition of
innovating rms encompasses rms that continuously employed R&D person-
nel during 2006-2009. Because the focus of our analysis is on rms that have
conducted at least some R&D outsourcing on a given year, we further restrict
the sample to these rms and denote the corresponding sample sample A. This
sample comprises 4,191 rm-year observations and 1,457 rms. As shown in
Table 1, sample A decreases from 1,109 rms in 2006 to 984 rms in 2009, due
to a reduction in R&D outsourcing by rms. As a check for robustness, we
also conduct the analysis at the level of innovating rms, without restricting
the analysis to those that on a given year had engaged in outsourcing. We
denote the corresponding sample sample B. Sample B is a balanced panel of
2,352 rms and 9,408 rm-year observations. The di¤erence in the number of
rms between sample A and sample B is because 895 rms did not engage in
outsourcing during our period of interest.
The average annual amount spent on outsourcing by rms in sample A is
641,132 (2006) Euros. The average share of outsourcing to universities is 17.5%;
the remaining share of rm outsourcing is mainly directed to other rms. The
percentage of rms that employ R&D personnel with PhD degrees is 26.5%;
and among these rms, the average percentage of employees with PhD degrees
2The database and additional information are available at
http://icono.fecyt.es/contenido.asp?dir=05)Publi/AA)panel.
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is 21. In sample B, 20% of the rms employ R&D personnel with PhD degrees;
and among these rms, the average percentage of employees with PhD degrees
is 25. Not surprisingly, the variability in the PhD composition of rm R&D
units is higher across rms than within rms. In sample A, the across-rm
standard deviation is 0.39, while the within-rm standard deviation is 0.18. In
sample B, the corresponding gures are 0.35 and 0.17, respectively. Moreover,
in samples A and B, the within-rm variation is generated by only 5% of the
sample observations. As expected, the highest concentration of sta¤ with PhD
degrees is in the pharmaceutical sector: 73% of pharmaceutical rms in sample
A and 80% of pharmaceutical rms in sample B employ R&D personnel with
PhD degrees. The chemistry sector is next with 36% of the rms in sample A
and 43% of rms in sample B employing R&D personnel with PhD degrees.
h Insert Table 1 about here i
3.2 Econometric methodology
To test whether the composition of a rms R&D unit a¤ects the share of rm
R&D outsourcing to universities, we estimate a model that relates the share of
rm R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of their internal R&D
units and a number of controls. The equation we estimate is:
Out_UNIit = 0 + 1PhDit +X
0
it + "it (1)
where Out_UNIit is the share of a rms i R&D outsourcing to universities
(in logs) in year t. The variable PhDit is a dummy that takes the value of
one if the R&D unit employs at least one employee with a PhD degree. We
also estimate an alternative specication of equation 1 that considers the share
of R&D sta¤ that holds a PhD degree (PhDit_Share) in logs. Finally, Xit
is a matrix of controls that we believe may impact the direction of a rms
outsourcing.
Out_UNIit = 0 + 1PhDit_Share+X
0
it + it (2)
Specically, Xit includes rm size (Size), which we measure by the log of a
rms number of employees, and rm R&D intensity (R&D Intensity), which
we dene as the log of a rms total R&D expenditures per employee3 . These
controls have been extensively used in the economic literature (see for instance
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002) as proxies for
the absorptive capacity of rms, and they have been shown to a¤ect R&D out-
sourcing by rms. Additionally, we control for the size of the R&D unit, Size
R&D unit, with a count of the full time equivalents working in an R&D unit.
We also include a dummy that takes a value of one if a rm sells its products
overseas (Export); a dummy that takes a value of one if a rm is foreign-owned
(Foreign); a dummy that takes a value of one if a rm is a parent company
3Details on the construction of the variables are presented in Appendix B.
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(Parent); and a dummy that takes a value of one if a rm is the product of
a joint venture (Joint_venture). These dummies are meant to capture factors
that might a¤ect the outsourcing decisions of a rm.
Following Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), we control for a rms obstacles
to innovation. We distinguish between four types of obstacles. The rst is a
lack of funds available for innovation. In the Spanish survey, rms rated the
following options on a scale from one (very important) to four (unimportant):
i) lack of funds within the rm or group and ii) a lack of funds from sources
outside the rm. To measure the rst type of obstacle, we use a dummy that
takes a value of one if a rm attached moderate or high importance to either i) or
ii). We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_funds. The second obstacle
to innovation we control for refers to a lack of qualied personnel assigned to
innovation activities. As a measure, we include a dummy that takes a value
of one if a rm responded that a lack of qualied personnel was of moderate
or high importance. We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_qualied.
The third obstacle to innovation is a lack of information. In the survey, using
the same scale as above, rms rated the importance they attached to the i) lack
of information about technology; ii) lack of information about markets. We
include a dummy that the takes a value of one if a rm responded that either
i) or ii) was of moderate or high importance. We denote the corresponding
variable Obstacle_information. Finally, the fourth obstacle we consider is the
di¢ culty of nding partners for innovation projects. We include a dummy that
the takes a value of one if a rm responded that this obstacle was of moderate
or high importance. We denote the corresponding variable Obstacle_partner.
The rationale for controlling for obstacles to innovation is that these may a¤ect
the type and the organization of projects that are assigned to a rms R&D unit
and, thus, the R&D outsourcing decisions of a rm.
We also control for the degree to which rms can appropriate the results
from their innovation projects. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Cassiman
and Veugelers (2005) have found that the appropriability of results is likely to
be an issue when a rm considers outsourcing to other rms rather than to
universities. Because our dependent variable is dened as the share of R&D
outsourcing to universities, where the remaining share is represented by out-
sourcing to rms, we expect appropriability to have an impact on our outcome
measure. We follow Czarnitzki et al. (2007) and construct a measure of industry
e¤ectiveness at appropriating results from innovation. Hence, we average the
scores (from one to four) at the 2-digit NACE industry level that rms reported
when answering the following question: "how important are your competitors
as a source of information for the innovation process?"4 We then rescale the
total score to a measure that varies between zero and one, and we denote this
measure Appropriability.
4When averaging rmsanswers across industry sectors, we exclude the answer provided
by rm i.
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We also include a measure for the local availability of university knowledge,
which is likely to a¤ect the decision of rms to outsource to universities (Ja¤e,
1989; Manseld and Lee, 1996; Audretsch, 2005). This is dened as the total
number of scientic articles (expressed in logs) that were published in 2005-2009
by universities located in the same region as the rm and that are relevant to
a rms industry. We denote this variable Publications. Finally, we control for
industry, region5 , and year xed e¤ects.
Obtaining evidence on the causal relationship between the composition of a
rms R&D unit and the share of R&D outsourcing to universities is complicated
by a number of factors. The decision of a rm to hire a certain R&D unit may be
a¤ected by its expectations regarding the availability of external partners with
which the corresponding R&D unit could collaborate. Moreover, it may also be
a¤ected by the local availability of R&D employees, which are partly supplied
by universities. To the extent that we control for the local availability of uni-
versity knowledge, then this should not be a serious concern. However, it may
still be the case that our measure for the availability of university knowledge is
subject to measurement error. Indeed, not all university knowledge is contained
in scientic articles but it may still be relevant to rms. Further biases could be
caused by omitted variables that might be correlated with both the composition
of a rms R&D unit and the rms decision to outsource to universities. To ad-
dress these problems, we estimate an Instrumental Variables (IV), continuous,
regression model that replaces the variables PhDit and PhDit_Share, in equa-
tions 1 and 2, respectively, with their predicted values. We follow Cassiman and
Veugelers (2002) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2005) and derive the predicted
values by regressing PhDit and PhDit_Share on the industry average of PhD
sta¤ employed6 and the other exogenous regressors.
Out_UNIit = 0 + 1 dPhDit +X 0it + it (3)
Out_UNIit = 0 + 1 dPhDit_Share+X 0it +  it (4)
We estimate our IV models using a two-stage least squares estimator, which
delivers consistent estimates and requires few distributional assumptions (Wooldridge,
2002; Angrist and Pischke, 2008). We cluster standard errors at the rm level.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for samples A and B.
h Insert Table 2 about here i
5We include industry dummies for the NACE-2 industry sectors. We also include dummies
for the following NUTS1 regions: Northwest, Northeast, Center, East, and South.
6 In the count we exclude rm i.
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3.3 Results
Table 3 reports the regression results for the impact of the composition of a
rms R&D unit on the share of outsourcing to universities. The rst and
the second columns display the OLS estimation results, while the third and
the fourth columns display the IV estimation results7 . Columns one and three
examine the impact of having at least one R&D employee with a PhD degree
(PhDit). Conversely, columns two and four examine the impact of the share of
R&D sta¤ that holds a PhD degree (PhDit_Share).
We nd that having at least one R&D employee with a PhD degree has a
positive impact on the share of outsourcing to universities, all else being equal.
The coe¢ cient is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. Having
at least one R&D employee with a PhD increases the share of outsourcing to
universities by 90%. We interpret this result as evidence that R&D units with
relatively lower learning costs for basic projects tend to match with external
partners, universities, with relatively lower learning costs for the same projects.
While this result does not rule out the possibility that R&D units with PhD
sta¤ collaborate with other rms, it shows that for R&D projects, collaboration
tends to be relatively more intense among partners with similar comparative
advantages. Collaboration with private companies might still occur for a num-
ber of reasons. First, there are some projects, which do not necessarily involve
learning new problems, and for these projects our matching story might not
apply. Second, some rms might have lower learning costs than universities,
for basic projects. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish in our data the char-
acteristics of rms to whom outsourcing is done. Finally, it might be that the
conditions o¤ered by universities, including the price of the collaboration, are
more onerous than those o¤ered by private companies, thus inducing a rm to
opt for its second-best option.
When we consider the share of R&D sta¤ with a PhD degree, its impact
on the share of rm outsourcing to universities is still positive and highly sig-
nicant. The elasticity is 0.22. Having taken the endogeneity of PhDit and
PhDit_Share into account, the results still hold. Their coe¢ cients are still
positive and statistically signicant at the 1% signicance level. This suggests a
causal relationship between employing internal R&D sta¤ with relatively lower
costs for conducting basic projects and selecting external partners with a similar
cost structure.
The results regarding the control variables reveal additional, interesting in-
sights. The impact of rm size on the share of outsourcing to universities is
negative, although only statistically signicant at the 10% level, as presented
in column two. Moreover, rms that reported a lack of qualied personnel as
7The results of the rst-step regressions from which we derived the predicted values of
PhDit and PhDit_Share are reported in Appendix C.
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an important obstacle to innovation tend to outsource relatively less to univer-
sities. Interestingly, rms that indicated that a lack of information on either
technology or external markets was an important obstacle to innovation tend
to outsource relatively more to universities, suggesting that universities play an
important role in lling information gaps of rmsR&D units. Finally, rms
that had indicated di¢ culty in nding external partners tend to collaborate rel-
atively more with universities. This last result might point to an additional role
of universities, one of providing knowledge when it cannot be o¤ered by other
partners. Finally, as expected, the local availability of university knowledge is
an important driver of the rmsdecisions to outsource to universities.
h Insert Table 3 about here i
4 Robustness check analysis
We conduct a series of robustness checks to ensure that our results of interest
hold using di¤erent model specications. First, we estimate a Heckman selection
model where we model the likelihood that a rm has outsourcing expenditures
as a function of the covariates that we used in the previous regressions and an
additional variable, whether the rm is located in a technology park. We use
sample B for this analysis. In Spain, technology parks are created by either the
federal or regional governments with the aim of attracting innovative rms and
universities and encouraging intra-park collaboration (Vásquez-Urriago et al.,
2011). While locating in one of these parks might facilitate external collabora-
tion it should not bias collaboration with either rms or universities, as both
are present in these parks. To validate our conjecture, we included a dummy for
whether a rm is located in a technology park in equations one and two. The
coe¢ cient on the dummy was not statistically signicant in either case. How-
ever, being located in a technology park has a positive and signicant impact
on the likelihood that a rm outsources. The results are reported in Table 4.
The coe¢ cients of PhDit and PhDit_Share are still positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level. This suggests that had rm R&D units that con-
ducted no outsourcing engaged in outsourcing, they would have matched with
external partners based on their learning costs.
In Table 5, we present the results of estimations of equations 1-4, using a
one-year lag for our independent variables of interest. Using lags controls for
the possibility of a time gap between the point at which a rm R&D unit begins
working on a project and the time when it begins working with an external
partner. As expected, the results are robust to using a one-year lag.
Finally, in Table 6 we present the results of estimations of equations 1-4
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using a random e¤ect (RE) model8 . The results for the impacts of PhDit and
PhDit_Share on the share of outsourcing to universities hold also in this case.
h Insert Table 4 about here i
h Insert Table 5 about here i
h Insert Table 6 about here i
8We refrain from estimating a xed-e¤ect model because intra-rm variability is only gen-
erated by 5% of the sample.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Our study makes two important contributions to the understanding of the op-
timal organization of R&D rms and their choice of outsourcing partners. The
rst contribution consists of extending the theory of hierarchical sorting within
an organization developed by Garicano (2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2005),
and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) to the optimal matching between
rmsinternal R&D units and external outsourcing partners.
Our theory examines a setting in which the manager of an R&D rm needs
to select a project from a menu of projects that di¤er in some characteristic. In
our model, labor is sticky, and the rms choice depends on the knowledge of its
internal R&D unit, the composition of which does not change. This analysis is
appropriate to analyze the short-run decisions of rms, especially in contexts in
which the labor market is characterized by important rigidities. Once the rm
manager has made her choice, she needs to select an external partner that will
collaborate on the project with the internal R&D unit. Our focus is on projects
that involve the creation of new knowledge and that require at least some level
of outsourcing. This last characteristic is typical of projects that are complex
enough that a rm is induced to hire an external partner, which will assist the
internal R&D unit with problem solving. The rationale for hiring an external
partner is that the partner can obtain a certain level of knowledge, on a project
chosen by the rm, at lower costs than the rms internal R&D unit.
Our main result is that in an economy with a continuum of rms distributed
across a project characteristics, rms will nd it optimal to select a project
for which the internal R&D unit and the external partner will have a similar
comparative advantage in problem solving. This is because it allows the external
partner to spend relatively more time solving rarer problems than assisting the
internal R&D unit. We believe this is an interesting result in that it shows
that a prot-maximizing strategy for an rm consists in having the external
partner relatively specialize in solving rarer problems, and have the internal
R&D unit relatively specialize in solving the most common ones. Indeed, it is
not protable for a rm to outsource the solution to problems to an external
partner, and have the internal unit specialize on the application of the relative
solutions.
The second contribution we make is to test the predictions of our theory
using a rich dataset of Spanish manufacturing rms that conducted innovating
activities during the 2006-2009 period. Within this sample, we focus on those
rms that conducted at least some level of R&D outsourcing. For these rms,
we relate the share of R&D outsourcing to universities to the composition of
their R&D units, described by the presence of sta¤ with a PhD degree. The
logic is that both universities and R&D units with PhD sta¤ members have
lower relative costs of conducting relatively more basic projects than companies
to which the rm might want to outsource or with sta¤ without PhD degrees.
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We nd evidence that R&D units with PhD sta¤ tend to collaborate relatively
more with universities than with other partners. We interpret this result as
evidence that R&D units with relatively low learning costs for basic projects
tend to match with external partners, universities, with relatively low learning
costs for the same projects.
We believe our study contributes to uncovering the mechanisms through
which R&D collaboration generates value for a rm. The patterns we have
highlighted are typical of projects that involve the creation of new knowledge.
These are projects in which the value added is measured in terms of the number
of problems that are solved. For these projects, we analyzed the properties of
an optimal match between rmsR&D units and their external partners. The
reality, of course, is more complex than the one we have described. Indeed, rms
not only can choose projects, conditionally on the characteristics of an R&D
unit, but they can also hire new R&D units conditionally on the characteristics
of a project they intend to undertake. Even in these cases, the problem of
nding an optimal match between an internal R&D unit and an external partner
remains relevant. By nding an optimal match, the rm achieves the optimal
allocation of the internal units time between problem solving and production,
as well as the optimal allocation of the external partners time between problem
solving and assisting the internal unit.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1 we need to show that dze(p)dce(p) < 0 and
dzi(p)
dce(p)
< 0. We
begin by computing dzi(p)dce(p) : Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
that dzi(p)dce(p) =  
@2
@zi@ce
@2
@z2
i
. By inspection, @
2
@z2i
is negative and, thus, the sign of
dzi(p)
dce(p)
depends on the sign of @
2
@zi@ce
. This last expression is equal to:
@2
@zi@ce
=  ze
ce
[
h
ce
f 0(ze)f(zi)(1  cizi)  f(ze)ci]  h
c2e
f(ze)f(zi)(1  cizi)
Using the rst order condition for zi, we can rewrite the expression above
as:
@2
@zi@ce
=  ze
ce
[
h
ce
f 0(ze)f(zi)(1  cizi)  f(ze)ci]  F (ze)
ce
ci
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Noting that @
2R
@zi@ze
= hce f
0(ze)f(zi)(1  cizi)  f(ze)ci;we rewrite:
@2
@zi@ce
=  ze
ce
[
@2R
@zi@ze
]  F (ze)
ce
ci
This expression is < 0 if
 @2R@zi@ze  < F (ze)ze ci = k, which we have assumed in
the text.
Regarding dze(p)dce(p) , this expression is equal to:
dze(p)
dce(p)
=  ze
ce
+
h
ce
f(zi)
dzi(p)
dce(p)
Standard comparative statics show that dze(p)dce(p) < 0 if
 @2R@zi@ze  < k.
Appendix B: Variables Construction
h Insert Table B1 about here i
To obtain the publications in scientic elds that are relevant to a rm in
a given industry, we follow Abramovsky et al. (2009) and match the scientic
elds to industries using data from the 1994 Carnegie Mellon Survey (CNS).
This survey reports the importance of the following ten research elds to each
industry: biology, chemistry, physics, computer science, material science, med-
ical and health science, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical
engineering and mathematics. We follow Abramovsky et al.s criterion that a re-
search eld is relevant for an industry if more than 50% of the CNS respondents
report that the eld is moderately or very important for the industry in which
the respondent is active. Table B2 shows the matching between industries and
scientic elds. Data on publications by university and scientic eld for were
obtained from website: http://sci2s.ugr.es/rankinguniversidades/. This web-
site provides information on the total number of publications for every Spanish
university in di¤erent scientic elds using data from Thomson-Reuters Web of
Science although the information is not provided on an annual basis.
h Insert Table B2 about here i
Appendix C: First-step regressions
h Insert Table C1 about here i
h Insert Table C2 about here i
20
References
[1] Abramovsky, L., Harrison, R., Simpson, H. (2009). University research and
the location of business R&D. Economic Journal 117, 114-141.
[2] Abramovsky, L., Kremp, E., Lopez, A., Schmidt, T., Simpson, H. (2009).
Understanding co-operative innovative activity: Evidence from four Euro-
pean countries. Economics of Innovation and New Technology 18(3), 243-
265.
[3] Aghion, P., Dewatripont, M., Stein, J. (2008). Academic freedom, private-
sector focus, and the process of innovation. RAND Journal of Economics,
39(3), 617-635.
[4] Angrist, J., Pischke S. (2008). Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiri-
cists Companion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
[5] Alcacer, J., and W. Chung. (2007). "Location Strategies and Knowledge
Spillovers." Management Science, 53(5): 760-776.
[6] Audretsch, D. B., Lehmann, E. E. , Warning S. (2005). University Spillovers
and New Firm Location. Research Policy, 34(7):1113-1122.
[7] Belderbos, R., Carree, M., Diederen, B., Lokshin, B., Veugelers R. (2004).
Heterogeneity in R&D cooperation strategies. International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization 22, 1237 1263.
[8] Branstetter L. G. (2005). Exploring the Link between Academic Science
and Industrial Innovation. Annales dEconomie et de
[9] Statistique 70, 119-142.
[10] Cassiman, B, Veugelers, R. (2002). R&D Cooperation and Spillovers: Some
Empirical Evidence from Belgium. American Economic Review 92(4), 1169-
1184.
[11] Cassiman, B, Veugelers, R. (2005). In Search of Complementarity in the
Innovation Strategy: Internal R&D and External Knowledge Acquisition.
Management Science 52 (1), 68-82.
[12] Cockburn, I. M., Henderson, R. M. (1998). Absorptive capacity, coauthor-
ing behavior, and the organization of research in drug discovery. Journal
of Industrial Economics, 46(2), 157-182.
[13] Cohen, W., Levinthal, D. (1989). Innovation and learning: the two faces of
R&D. Economic Journal 99, 569-596.
[14] Cohen, W., Nelson, R. Walsh, J. (2002). Links and impacts: the inuence
of public research on industrial R&D. Management Science 48(1), 1-23.
21
[15] Czarnitzki, D., Ebersberger, B., Fier, A. (2007). The relationship between
R&D collaboration, subsidies and R&D performance: empirical evidence
from Finland and Germany. Journal of Applied Econometrics 22, 1347-
1366.
[16] Czarnitzki, D., Toole, A. (2011). Patent protection, market uncertainty
and product innovation. The Review of Economics and Statistics 93(1),
147-159.
[17] Garicano, L. (2000). Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in
Production. Journal of Political Economy, 108(5): 874-904.
[18] Garicano, L., Hubbard, T. N. (2005). Hierarchical sorting and learning
costs: Theory and evidence from the law. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 58(2): 349-369.
[19] Garicano, L., Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006). Organization and Inequality in a
Knowledge Economy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4): 1383-
1435.
[20] Gittelman, M. and B. Kogut. (2003). Does Good Science Lead to Valuable
Knowledge? Biotechnology Firms and the Evolutionary Logic of Citation
Patterns.Management Science, 49(4): 366-382.
[21] Griliches, Z. (1979). Issues in assessing the contribution of Research and
Development to Productivity Growth. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 92-
116.
[22] Gruber, M., Harho¤, D., Hoisl, K. (2012). Knowledge Recombination across
Technological Boundaries: Scientists versus Engineers. Management Sci-
ence, forthcming
[23] Hagedoorn, J. (2002). Inter-rm R&D partnerships: an overview of major
trends and patterns since 1960. Research Policy, 31: 477 492.
[24] Ja¤e, A. (1989). Real E¤ects of Academic Research. American Economic
Review, 79(5): 957-970.
[25] Lacetera, N. (2009). Di¤erent missions and commitment power in R&D
organizations: Theory and evidence on industry-university alliances. Orga-
nization Science, 20(3): 565-582.
[26] Leiponen, A., (2005). Skills and Innovation. International Journal of In-
dustrial Organization, 23 (56): 303323.
[27] Lopez, A., (2008). Determinants for R&D cooperation: Evidence from
Spanish manufacturing rms. International Journal of Industrial Organi-
zation 26(1), 113-136.
22
[28] Manseld, E., Lee J-Y. (1996)."The modern university: contributor to
industrial innovation and recipient of industrial R&D support." Research
Policy, 25(7): 1047-1058.
[29] Raymond, W., Mohnen, P., Palm, F. y van der Loe¤, S. (2010). Persis-
tence of innovation in Dutch manufacturing: is it spurious? The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 92(3), 495-504.
[30] Thursby J., Thursby M. (2006). Where is the New Science in Corporate
R&D? Science, 314, 1547-1548 .
[31] Vásquez-Urriago, A.R., Barge-Gil, A., Modrego, A., Paraskevopoulu, E.
(2011). The impact of Science and Technology Parks on rms product
innovation: empirical evidence from Spain. MPRA Working Paper, 30555,
University Library of Munich. Munich.
[32] Veugelers, R., Cassiman, B. (2005). R&D cooperation between rms and
universities. International Journal of Industrial Organization 23, 355-379.
[33] Wolf, A., Mora-Sanguinetti, J.S. (2011). Reforming the Labour Market in
Spain. OECD Economics Department Working Papers 845. OECD Pub-
lishing.
[34] Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel
Data. The MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
23
	

  
  
  
!  
 !" 






	






	






	





	


















	


















	




















 
!
 
 
 
"
 
#
$
%

&
 

 
!
 
 
 
"
 
#
$
%

&
 

'


 
!
 
%

&
%


%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%

%
%

%
%
 
%
%

'



'



 
!
 
%
#
%
 

$
%

&
 
!

%
$
%
"
&
 

 
%

&
 

'



'















(


 
!
 
%
&
 
%
"
)
%


%
!

%
$
%
"
&
%

#
%


%

*


 
!
 

"
$
 
)
$
%
!

)
!

%
$

)

 
)

%
!

)
+









 
!
 
$

"
 

&
%
 


)
!

%
$
$
%
)
 

"
%
 

!


*


+







 
!
 
 
#
!
 

)
%
&

#
!

%
$
 


 
 
"
%
&

#






 
!
 
%
!
%
%
)
%
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
$
$
%
)

%
 
%
%
,

(


 
!
 
%
"
)
%
"
%
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%


%
"
%
%
 
%
%






 
!
 
%
 
 
%
)

%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
%
!
%

!
%
 
%
%
-









 
!
 
%
%
 
%
 

%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
%
 
%
 
 
%
 
%
%







,





 
!
 
%
#

%

"
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
#

%

"
%
 
%
%







.



,



 
!
 
%

"
%
"
%
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%

&
%
"
%
%
 
%
%








,






 
!
 
%
"

%
"
%
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
"

%
"
%
%
 
%
%














 
!
 
%
)
$
%

$
%
 
%
%
!

%
$
%
)
"
%

$
%
 
%
%











 
!
 

"
"
%
 
#
 
)
)
)


!

%
$

"
&
%
 
#
 

%
%











 
!
 
&


)
)
%
%
 
%
 
&
!

%
$
&

)
)
)
)
%
 
%
 
&
Table 3. Main Regressions. Sample A.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
phd 0.642*** 1.181***
[0.100] [0.426]
phd_share 0.217*** 0.332***
[0.034] [0.119]
size -0.092 -0.102* -0.08 -0.08
[0.057] [0.058] [0.057] [0.057]
RD_intensity 0.001 -0.019 0 -0.013
[0.050] [0.053] [0.050] [0.052]
size_RD_unit 0.024 -0.03 0.057 0.04
[0.061] [0.074] [0.061] [0.063]
export 0.118 0.111 0.103 0.091
[0.127] [0.125] [0.126] [0.125]
foreign 0.029 0.02 0.02 0.011
[0.099] [0.099] [0.099] [0.099]
parent 0.134 0.107 0.147 0.137
[0.136] [0.139] [0.136] [0.136]
joint_venture 0.272 0.317 0.259 0.28
[0.291] [0.303] [0.305] [0.320]
obstacle_funds -0.025 -0.036 -0.019 -0.023
[0.087] [0.088] [0.087] [0.087]
obstacle_qualified -0.402*** -0.374*** -0.412*** -0.399***
[0.084] [0.090] [0.084] [0.086]
obstacle_information 0.207** 0.216** 0.206** 0.212**
[0.086] [0.087] [0.086] [0.086]
obstacle_partner 0.172** 0.162** 0.171** 0.164**
[0.080] [0.080] [0.080] [0.080]
appropriability -0.207 -0.219 -0.196 -0.197
[0.277] [0.270] [0.278] [0.272]
publications 0.038*** 0.026* 0.037*** 0.029*
[0.013] [0.015] [0.013] [0.015]
_cons 1.27 1.507 1.172 1.269
[0.947] [0.951] [0.951] [0.946]
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
N 4191 4191 4191 4191
chi2 279.013 276.564
r2 0.127 0.113 0.128 0.122
The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample A includes 
all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. 
Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 4. Main Regressions. Sample B. Heckman Model
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
phd 0.613*** 1.042**
[0.100] [0.445]
phd_share 0.210*** 0.306**
[0.034] [0.131]
size -0.108* -0.116* -0.095* -0.105*
[0.058] [0.060] [0.058] [0.059]
RD_intensity -0.024 -0.045 -0.022 -0.046
[0.050] [0.054] [0.051] [0.054]
size_RD_unit 0.008 -0.02 0.041 0.036
[0.062] [0.072] [0.061] [0.063]
export 0.109 0.088 0.095 0.079
[0.126] [0.131] [0.126] [0.131]
foreign 0.004 -0.023 -0.001 -0.029
[0.099] [0.101] [0.099] [0.102]
parent 0.132 0.129 0.145 0.147
[0.135] [0.137] [0.135] [0.136]
joint_venture 0.255 0.265 0.244 0.244
[0.294] [0.288] [0.308] [0.287]
obstacle_funds -0.025 -0.025 -0.019 -0.02
[0.087] [0.089] [0.087] [0.089]
obstacle_qualified -0.398*** -0.378*** -0.408*** -0.386***
[0.084] [0.087] [0.083] [0.086]
obstacle_information 0.204** 0.199** 0.204** 0.194**
[0.086] [0.087] [0.086] [0.087]
obstacle_partner 0.154* 0.151* 0.154* 0.150*
[0.080] [0.082] [0.080] [0.082]
appropriability -0.214 -0.179 -0.202 -0.172
[0.277] [0.285] [0.277] [0.285]
publications 0.039*** 0.031** 0.038*** 0.033**
[0.013] [0.016] [0.013] [0.015]
_cons 1.851* 1.972** 1.692* 1.895*
[0.946] [0.984] [0.950] [0.979]
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
N 9408 9408 9408 9408
chi2 303.142 259.782 302.423 259.782
rho -0.141 -0.158 -0.126 -0.158
The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample B includes 
all innovating firms, without restricting the analysis to those that on a given year had 
engaged in outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 5. Main Regressions. Sample A. 1 lag
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
lag_phd 0.611*** 1.041**
[0.108] [0.450]
lag_phd_share 0.012*** 0.033**
[0.003] [0.015]
size -0.087 -0.091 -0.067 -0.042
[0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.067]
RD_intensity 0.015 0.002 0.025 0.01
[0.056] [0.058] [0.057] [0.060]
size_RD_unit 0.014 -0.03 0.068 0.05
[0.067] [0.081] [0.068] [0.070]
export 0.121 0.115 0.119 0.101
[0.140] [0.137] [0.141] [0.139]
foreign 0.102 0.097 0.1 0.087
[0.107] [0.107] [0.108] [0.109]
parent 0.148 0.123 0.179 0.173
[0.149] [0.152] [0.149] [0.150]
joint_venture 0.214 0.229 0.188 0.179
[0.322] [0.329] [0.340] [0.398]
obstacle_funds -0.017 -0.027 -0.01 -0.024
[0.096] [0.097] [0.097] [0.097]
obstacle_qualified -0.374*** -0.360*** -0.390*** -0.382***
[0.092] [0.095] [0.091] [0.093]
obstacle_informati 0.173* 0.181* 0.162* 0.162*
[0.095] [0.096] [0.095] [0.096]
obstacle_partner 0.202** 0.197** 0.207** 0.202**
[0.086] [0.086] [0.087] [0.088]
appropriability -0.029 -0.011 -0.042 -0.021
[0.326] [0.319] [0.333] [0.328]
publications 0.047*** 0.037** 0.054*** 0.040**
[0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016]
_cons 0.508 0.581 0.354 0.264
[1.072] [1.063] [1.097] [1.104]
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
N 3082 3082 3082 3082
chi2 262.326 245.329
r2 0.131 0.122 0.121 0.093
The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample A includes all 
innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. Clustered 
standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. We allow for a one-year lag 
between the composition of an internal R&D unit and the share of firm outsourcing.
Table 6. Main Regression. Sample A. Random Effects
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
phd 0.361*** 1.245***
[0.081] [0.281]
phd_share 0.118*** 0.368***
[0.027] [0.099]
size -0.027 -0.085* -0.021 -0.037
[0.048] [0.046] [0.048] [0.048]
RD_intensity 0.014 -0.011 0.015 -0.002
[0.038] [0.042] [0.038] [0.040]
size_RD_unit -0.001 -0.044 0.016 0.004
[0.050] [0.056] [0.050] [0.051]
export 0.238** 0.136 0.235** 0.188**
[0.104] [0.091] [0.104] [0.096]
foreign -0.012 -0.003 -0.014 -0.034
[0.087] [0.069] [0.087] [0.078]
parent 0.215* 0.112 0.223** 0.186*
[0.113] [0.094] [0.113] [0.102]
joint_venture 0.195 0.328 0.187 0.261
[0.232] [0.226] [0.233] [0.217]
obstacle_funds 0.053 -0.011 0.054 0.045
[0.069] [0.062] [0.069] [0.063]
obstacle_qualified -0.312*** -0.352*** -0.315*** -0.329***
[0.071] [0.062] [0.071] [0.061]
obstacle_information 0.132* 0.199*** 0.131* 0.152**
[0.070] [0.062] [0.070] [0.062]
obstacle_partner 0.089 0.146** 0.091 0.109*
[0.067] [0.059] [0.067] [0.058]
appropriability 0.149 -0.115 0.145 0.098
[0.218] [0.221] [0.218] [0.222]
publications 0.046*** 0.025** 0.046*** 0.028**
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014]
_cons 0.024 1.11 -0.008 0.259
[0.743] [0.766] [0.743] [0.760]
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
N 4191 4191 4191 4191
chi2 302.622 441.253 293.175 287.319
The dependent variable is the share of firm outsourcing to universities. Sample A includes 
all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at least some outsourcing. 
Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table C1. First Step of IV regressions. Sample A. 
[1] [2]
Dummy PHD Share PHDs
size 0.031*** 0.047
[0.012] [0.036]
RD_intensity 0.022** 0.060**
[0.009] [0.027]
size_RD_unit 0.069*** 0.064*
[0.011] [0.035]
export 0.017 0.074
[0.021] [0.070]
foreign 0.008 0.031
[0.019] [0.057]
parent 0.047* 0.077
[0.028] [0.082]
joint_venture -0.102* -0.241
[0.057] [0.157]
obstacle_funds -0.005 -0.028
[0.016] [0.047]
obstacle_qualified -0.003 0.017
[0.014] [0.043]
obstacle_information -0.014 -0.032
[0.015] [0.044]
obstacle_partner 0.01 0.01
[0.013] [0.037]
appropriability -0.011 0.022
[0.041] [0.123]
publications 0.006** 0.015*
[0.003] [0.009]
phd_share_industry_average 0.215*** 0.772***
[0.022] [0.066]
_cons -0.308* -0.753
[0.162] [0.487]
N 4191 4191
chi2 687.478 431.192
Sample A includes all innovating firms that on a given year had conducted at 
least some outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table C2. Selection Equation. Sample B. Heckman Model
[1] [2] [3] [4]
OLS IV OLS IV
phd 0.201*** 1.179***
[0.054] [0.246]
phd_share 0.055*** 0.346***
[0.017] [0.072]
park 0.205* 0.203* 0.205* 0.203*
[0.112] [0.112] [0.112] [0.112]
size 0.119*** 0.102*** 0.121*** 0.114***
[0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035]
RD_intensity 0.170*** 0.136*** 0.170*** 0.134***
[0.030] [0.032] [0.031] [0.032]
size_RD_unit 0.116*** 0.037 0.126*** 0.100***
[0.038] [0.042] [0.038] [0.038]
export 0.051 0.021 0.05 0.01
[0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.063]
foreign 0.152*** 0.125** 0.151*** 0.118**
[0.053] [0.054] [0.053] [0.054]
parent 0.023 -0.015 0.026 0.006
[0.076] [0.077] [0.076] [0.077]
joint_venture 0.111 0.179 0.107 0.155
[0.161] [0.159] [0.161] [0.159]
obstacle_funds 0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.006
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047]
obstacle_qualified -0.023 0.025 -0.025 0.016
[0.045] [0.047] [0.045] [0.046]
obstacle_information 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013
[0.047] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047]
obstacle_partner 0.121*** 0.112** 0.121*** 0.110**
[0.044] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044]
appropriability 0.051 0.022 0.054 0.031
[0.163] [0.164] [0.163] [0.164]
publications -0.006 -0.024*** -0.005 -0.023**
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
_cons -2.659*** -2.267*** -2.680*** -2.355***
[0.549] [0.561] [0.550] [0.558]
N 9408 9408 9408 9408
chi2 303.142 259.782 302.423 259.782
rho -0.141 -0.158 -0.126 -0.158
We estimate the probability that a firm, on a given year, did at least some level of 
outsourcing. Clustered standard errors in brackets; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
